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L
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment on two counts of child abuse. One
count a felony, the other a misdemeanor, both in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109,
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W.
Davis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f)
(Supp. 1994).

n.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The following is a summary of issues presented for review in Janet Ward's appeal, with applicable
standards of review. Citations to the record, including citations showing that these issues were
preserved for appeal, are designated by "R.
"Tr.

.", and citations to the transcripts are designated as

"
1. Whether Appellant should be granted a new trial as a result of the ineffective

assistance of trial counsel
Standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffectiveness of counsel claims
present a mixed question of fact and of law.1
2. Whether reversible error occurred when eliciting expert witness testimony regarding
the credibility of the alleged victim.
Standard of review in child abuse cases. An expert witness may not testify as to the
truthfulness found in the victim's claim. In considering the potential harmfiilness of the introduction of
1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).

1

such evidence, the court will reverse itsfindingsif "in the absence of the evidentiary errors, if there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant."

This evidentiary error was

made by defense counsel, and such, no objection preserves the right of Appellant to appeal the
wrongful admission of this evidence.
Appellant review is also appropriate when an evidentiary error, such as this, is considered a
"plain error."3 Plain error occurs when the error is "obvious" and harmful. Id. In this case, plain error
occurred because: 1) it is obvious that one witness may not testify that another witness was telling the
truth, and 2) the testimony harmed the defendant because it bolstered the veracity of otherwise non
credible witnesses.
3. Whether the cumulative effects of the errors undermine the confidence of this court
that a fair trial was had.
Standard of review for the cumulative effect of errors.

The issue of cumulative errors

presents a mixed question of fact and of law, reviewed for correctness.

2L
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following United States Constitutional Amendments and Utah Rules of Evidence is listed
below and elsewhere in this brief.
United States Constitutional Amendment VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
2

State v. Riirimasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)

3

State v. Verde, 77

4

See generally, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (discussing standards of review)

P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).

2

have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 615.
Exclusion of Witnesses.
(1) At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear
the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its own motion.
(Emphasis added).
Rule 608.
Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation are evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, (Emphasis added)
Rule 401.
Definition of "Relevant Evidence" .
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
Rule 402.
Rule 402.

Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible.
Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.

All relevant evidence is admissible. . . . Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
(Emphasis added).
Rule 403.

Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Rule 801.
Definitions, [related to hearsay evidence]
Rule 801.
Definitions, [related to hearsay evidence]
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Rule 802.
Hearsay Rule.
Hearsay is not admissible.

3

EL
STATEMENT OF THE CASESTATEMENT OF THE CASE
Janet Ward, Defendant/Appellant, brings this appeal from her conviction on two counts of
child abuse, a second degree felony and a Class A misdemeanor, both in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-5-109.
Statement of Facts
1.

Janet Ward, the Defendant/Appellant, was a school teacher in the Alpine School

District from 1982 until 1995, when she was suspended pending the outcome of criminal charges
alleging she had abused her two adopted children, Will and Holly.5 No evidence or testimony was
introduced at trial suggesting that the Appellant, during her years of teaching, has ever had allegations
of child abuse brought against her.
2.

Appellant adopted Will and Holly, the alleged victims, in May of 1993, through the

foster care program.6 At that time, Will was 7 and Holly 5 years of age. The children came to
Appellant having been removed from the home of their biological parents, where they had suffered
from abuse and neglect.7 Although, evidence regarding the children's pre-adoption circumstances
could not be introduced, information regarding their abusive background did enter the trial court
proceeding peripherally, through other testimony.
While the children were in the home of the Appellant, they attended therapy sessions on either
5

Tr.

349, 362,

6

Tr.

335

7

Tr.

127,

'Tr.

125, 127, 128,

493

128
181

4

a weekly or a bi-weekly basis. Yet, at trial no evidence was admitted which would suggest that any of
the counselors who worked the children, during the period in which they resided with the Appellant,
reported anyfindingsor made any allegations of abuse of the children by the Appellant, to the Division
of Family Services or law enforcement agencies.
3.

The male child, Will, worked with therapists on issues of honesty and the violent

behaviors. He has exhibited these behaviors toward both his sister and the Appellant.
counseled about his history of running away from the home of the Appellant.

Will was also

According to both the

Appellant and Will, by September of 1995, Will had run away from home six or seven times.

The

female child, Holly, worked with counselors on issues of honesty, attachment disorder, wetting her
pants in public places.13
4.

At trial, both children testified against Appellant at trial. Yet, defense counsel failed to

question the children about their problematic history or therapeutic issues.

Additionally, defense

counsel failed to address incidents where Will had hit Holly, resulting in injuries.
5.

Therapist Aaron Burdge, who testified on Appellant's behalf worked with the children

on a weekly basis from January of 1994, until the children were removed from the Appellant's home

9

T r . 355, 356.

10

T r . 357, 515 f 516, 537-538.

11

T r . 535.

12

T r . 7 4 - 7 7 , 280.

13

T r . 123, 359.

14

T r . 57, 86, 309, 319.

15

Tr.

Id.

5

in September of 1995.

Mr. Burdge testified that Will and Holly had a problem with honesty, and that

Will was abusive to Holly.

Mr. Burdge also testified that Will had admitted to threatening

Appellant's life.18
6.

Defense counsel failed to question Mr. Burdge, if during the time he was counseling
19

the children, he had reason to believe that Will and Holy were being abused by the Appellant.
Defense counsel also failed to the question Mr. Burdge on his knowledge of any physical signs, such as
bruises, cuts, ect, on the children.
7.

After the adoption, the Appellant's husband often years, David Ward, moved out of

the home.

The couple attended marriage counseling sessions, but were unable to resolve their

differences, and divorced.

Mr. Ward had minimal contact with the children between the time of the

divorce, and the removal of the children from the home of the Appellant.23 Mr. Ward claimed that the
Appellant made it impossible for him to see the children, yet witnesses testified at trial, as to being in
the home of the Appellant, when Mr. Ward failed to pick up the children or failed to keep his scheduled
visits.

Will's therapist testified, that Will told him of an abusive telephone conversation he had with

16

T r . 507, 509.

17

T r . 515, 517.

18

T r . 537-538.

19

T r . 507-566.

20

Tr.

21

T r . 118.

22

T r . 118, 349.

23

T r . 132, 360, 3 6 1 .

24

T r . 137, 609.

Id.

6

Mr. Ward/'
^$7

Twe Teports of child abuse^ were filed against Mr. Ward, and substantiated by the

Division of Family Services. Defense counsel failed to question Mr. Ward regarding these reports*
As a result of Appellant's conviction, in part due to the testimony of Mr. Ward* against the
Appellant, Mr. Ward gained custody of the children and has been awarded in excess of $600 per month
for child support from the Appellant.
Defense counsel failed to question Mr. Ward regarding tnese issues and his possible bias,
9.

The Appellant testified that Will had threatened or tried to kill her on two occasions.

The first incident occurred in August of 1993, when Will told the Appellant that he would smash her
head in with a hammer, while she was sleeping. The second incident occurred in January of 1994,
when Will attempted to stab the Appellant with a large kitchen knife, missing her and striking the wall.
The Appellant reported both of these incidents to Will's counselor.

Will admitted to the counselor

and to Shilo Mayes from the Division of Family Services, that he had threatened the Appellant's life.
At trial, Will denied the incidents, with the Appellant and the discussions he had with his counselor and
Shilo Mayes, regarding his threats to kill the Appellant.

Tr. 527.
T r . 135-140.
Tr. 415-416, 537-538.
T r . 415.
T r . 416.
Tr.

150, 538.

T r . 699.

7

31

Defense counsel did not question the child's

inconsistency.

32
On or about September 13th, 1995, Will was battered.33

10.

At trial, the Appellant

testified regarding the battery, saying that Will had again, run away from home that evening,
when he returned the next morning, he was injured and his bicycle was damaged.

and

The Appellant

stayed home from work on that day to care for Will, and that afternoon took Will to the hospital,
prompted by her concern for Will's condition.

Will was treated and released.

The Appellant

contacted Mr. Burdge, Will's counselor, and discussed this incident, which resulted in the admittance
of Will to a juvenile psychiatric unit.
11.

Will first stated that he did not know how his injuries had occurred,

then later

reported that he had been in a bicycle accident.40 Will concluded with an alternate recollection that
Appellant had beaten him.41 Responding to this allegation, the State immediately assumed custody of
Will, and removed him from Appellant's home. Shortly thereafter, the State also removed Holly from
Appellant's home.42
32

Tr.

704.

33

Tr.

6-13,

34

Tr.

380 r 383, 386 r 387 r

35

Tr. 279, 397,

36

Tr.

396,

405-407.

37

Tr.

407,

409.

38

Tr.

414.

39

Tr.

397.

40

Tr.

68, 403.

41

Tr.

32.

42

Tr.

154.

146..
393,

399.

8

12.

The record indicates that defense counsel filed no pre-trial motions, nor memoranda in

response, to the State's Motion in Limine and Motion to Admit the Out of Court Statements of the
Children.
13.

Defense counsel failed to make objections throughout the proceeding , with regard to

prejudicial and irrelevant testimony, introduced by the prosecution.43 Defense counsel failed to invoke
the exclusionary rule, as both the child, Will, and the emergency room doctor testified.

Judge Davis

admonished witnesses seated in the courtroom, saying: "[T]here are a number of witnesses who are
here in the courtroom. And I've noted a fair amount of nodding or shaking of heads or those types of
things. That's inappropriate in any way as it relates to a reaction to testimony or attempt in any way to
influence testimony."45
14.. Defense counsel improperly elicited opinion testimony regarding the veracity of the
children, from one of these same witnesses, asking the question "did you feel that the children were
telling the truth as they spoke to you?" The witness answered "yes."46
15. The State called a number of witnesses from the school where Appellant taught, much of
the testimony elicited by the State from these witnesses was prejudicial, irrelevant, and contradictory,
defense counsel rarely made an objection.47
16. The State called a number of school teachers, principals and school assistants and elicited

T r . 105-173.
T r . 9 1 , 92.
Tr. 91-92.
T r . 172-173.
Tr. 233.

9

testimony that the children appeared more bruised and battered than "normal" children. . These
individuals testified that they never saw Appellant hit either of the children, nor that the children had
ever reported to them that Appellant was harming them49 Much of the testimony elicited by the State
from these witnesses was prejudicial and not relevant to the matter, Appellant's attorney fail to make
timely objections to their testimony. Defense counsel allowed the following testimony to continue,
before he made his objection: "she [Appellant] was taking them [the children] to another school
because we [referring to herself and the others who had testified] had all seen it [the alleged abuse] too
long."
17. Will and Holly were interviewed at the Children's Justice Center shortly after being taken
from Appellant's home. l This interview was videotaped.52 Prior to trial, Police Officer Kathy Stewart
gave a copy of the taped interview to Members of the Lehi School Board.

Officer Stewart testified

that she did this for two reasons. Thefirst,was that the Lehi School Board asked to see the videotape.
The second, was that she was personally upset over the fact that the Appellant was on paid leave,
during her suspension from the teaching at the school.54 Defense Counsel was aware of these facts, yet
failed to question these witnesses to see if they had view the videotape, and as to any impact it may
48

Tr. 174-245. Testifying on Janef's behalf were the teachers who taught Will and Holl
994-1995 school year. During this time period, which was the school year prior to September
they were taken from Janet, David Ward was not in the family home. These teachers testifie
the children were not abnormally bruised or injured. (Tr. 578-590).
49

Tr. Id. School Principal Linda Perkins who testified for the State admitted that Hoi
came to the school office to complain that Will was hitting her. (Tr. 199).

50

Tr. 233.

51

Tr. 106.

52

Tr. 107, 661.

53

Tr. 687.

54

Tr. 690.

10

have had on their testimony.
18. Appellant was also interviewed by a police officer regarding the children's allegations
She agreed to allow this interview to be videotaped.

The Appellant's attorney was aware that she

gave this interview, yet, he did not view the videotape prior to trial.

Defense counsel further errored

by putting the Appellant on the stand without reviewing the videotape.59 Yet another cumulative error
was made by defense counsel, brought to light at trial, when the prosecution sought to show the
videotape to the jury. Appellant's attorney stated "I haven't had a chance to see the videotape."
which Judge Davis replied: "then we have a little trouble with that, don't we."

To

The prosecutor

responded stating: "I don't know why he has not seen it." "I mean, my file indicates that we sent
discovery.. ,"62
19.

The effect of cumulative errors was that Appellant was found guilty based upon

evidence which amounted to little more than the unsubstantiated story of two children known to be
untruthful. Because of the cumulative errors the Appellant appeals the jury's verdict asking this Court
to grant her a new trial.

T r . 174-245.
Tr. 299.
T r . 300.
T r . 292.
T r . 334-442.
T r . 292.
T r . 292.
T r . 292.

11

V
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant, Janet Ward, deserves a new trial for the reasons that; Defense counsel failed to
provide her with competent representation for either the pre-trial and trial preparations or proceedings.
Defense counsel failed to file responsive motions to the State's Motion in Limine or the State's
Motion to Admit the out of court statements of the alleged victims. Further, Defense counsel
subjected the Appellant to cross examination, regarding a videotaped interview, taken by the police
department and used as State's evidence, when defense counsel had not viewed the videotape, which
defense counsel had in his possession since discovery was completed, without the benefit of having
watching a taped. Defense counsel neglected to invoke the exclusionary rule and allowed witnesses
who had not yet testified to hear the testimony of both the alleged victims and also the emergency
room physician. Additionally, he elicited testimony from a Utah State Social Worker, attesting to the
veracity of the alleged victims. He also failed to make objections when the State elicited testimony,
which was both irrelevant and prejudicial. In spite of the fact that both of the alleged victims where
known to be liars and were in counseling for this problem, he failed to question the alleged victims
about this problem. Although he was aware that many of the witnesses could have seen the videotaped
interview of the children telling social workers that their mother had beaten them, he neglected to
question these witnesses about this.
Therefore, Counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was not
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. This failure resulted in a guilty verdict
against Ms. Ward who faced charges of child abuse based upon the allegations of her adopted children.
Had counsel properly performed his duties to Appellant, it is likely that this result would not have

12

occurred because the State's case against her was not a strong one. It was based upon little more than
the word of two children who were known to be liars and the testimony of an angiy ex-husband who
had physically abused the children himself. Under such circumstances the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that the Appellant be given a new trial.
Perhaps the most conspicuous of counsel's errors was his violation of Rule 608(a) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. He violated this rule while cross examining Shilo Maynes, the D.F.S. social
worker, who was instrumental in having the children removed from Appellant's home and for having
charges brought against Appellant. He asked her, "Do you believe the children were telling you the
truth when they said their mother beat them?" She stated that "yes" she believed the children's story.
Counsel's question and the introduction of the witnesses opinion into evidence was improper in light of
Rule 608 and the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Rimasch63. This error was prejudicial to Appellant
as no other testimony was offered throughout the proceeding to show that these children were credible
witness and much testimony was elicited to show that these children were habitually untruthful.
If the Court were to find that none of counsel's errors taken individually caused prejudice to
Ms. Ward it would still be appropriate for the Court to remand this matter for a new trial based upon
the cumulative error doctrine. This doctrine requires reversal when the court finds that the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines the court's confidence that a fair trial was had.

Here,

Appellant's trial was so fraught with error that it would be impossible to find that Appellant received a
fair trial. Because of the cumulative error doctrine, a new trial is required.
VL
ARGUMENT
S t a t e v . Rirrtmasch, 775 P . 2 d 3 8 8 , 391 (Utah 1989)

13

Ineffective Assistance at Trial
1.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a

criminal proceeding the right to be effectively represented at trial. "The purpose [of this right] is simply
to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial."64 If a defendant does not receive effective
assistance and if this failure prejudices the defendant, reversal of the conviction is required.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant generally must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of
the trial.

Otherwise stated appellant must show: 1) deficient performance, and 2) a reasonable

probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different.

In addition, [a]

defendant must overcome the strong presumption that "'counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
/JO

of reasonable professional assistance[.]'"
However, "[i]n every case, the court must retain its concern as to whether, despite the strong
presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown
in the adversarial process."
64

Strickland

65

Id.

66

Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984);

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182

tah 1990) .
67

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), citing, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

8 (1984).
68
United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Strickland , 466 U
689); Accord v. Laycock , 880 F.2d at 1187; State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct. App.
93); Templin, 805 P.2d at 186.
69

LaFlave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, 1985 |g 11.10, pg. 527, (discussing the standa
Strickland) (internal quotation omitted) (citation omitted).

14

In this case, Defense Counsel's conduct fell far below an "objective standard of
reasonableness" and can not be deemed to "fall within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Here, Counsel's errors taken together or individually can not be explained away as tactical
decisions. His errors cast serious doubt upon his competency as a trial attorney in this particular case.
Given the small amount of evidence which the State had against Appellant, it can not be said that
counsel's many errors did not effect the outcome of her trial. Only by reading the entire record can one
truly understand the inadequacy of counsel's performance. As such, Appellant herein, has included
only the most flagrant examples of Counsel's inadequate performance.
Violation of Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence
(a)

Utah Rule of Evidence 615 allows counsel to exclude witnesses from the

courtroom in order to protect the integrity of the testimony. Instead of affording his client this
protection, he allowed the State's witnesses to be present in the courtroom while Will Ward testified
that the Appellant beat him. It is apparent that the exclusionary rule was not invoked since at the close
of the first day of trial the Judge admonished these witnesses for behaving inappropriately. Judge
Davis stated: "[T]here are a number of witnesses who are here in the courtroom. And I've noted a fair
amount of nodding or shaking of heads or those types of things. That's inappropriate in any way as it
related to a reaction to testimony or attempt in any way to influence testimony."70 The inappropriate
behavior of these witnesses, which took place in front of the jury, very likely prejudiced the jury against
Appellant. Additionally, from the Judge's comments, we may assume that it also could have effected
the content of Will's testimony. Rule 615 was enacted to maintain the integrity of the witnesses'
testimony and to prevent this very type of occurance. Appellant's attorney should have excluded these
Tr. 91-92.
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witnesses from the courtroom and protected Appellant from this prejudicial situation. Appellant's
attorney was apparently unaware of this rule and the protection that it would have afforded his client.
It is not within the realm of competent representation for any trial attorney to be unaware of such a
rule. His failure to invoke this rule can not be seen as a tactical decision and was not within the wide
range of reasonable professional choices. As such the first prong of Strickland is satisfied.
The second prong is also satisfied. The evidence against the Appellant in this case was not
great. It consisted primarily of the testimony of the alleged victims against her. In such a case an
audience full of emotional witnesses nodding approvingly while the victim testified could easily have
made the difference between conviction and acquittal. Therefore, under the Strickland test reversal is
required.
Violation of Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence
(b)

Appellant's attorney elicited testimony regarding the veracity of the victims

from the D.F.S. social worker who was primarily responsible for bringing the case against Appellant.
He asked her if she thought the children where telling the truth in her initial interview regarding
Appellant abusing them.

She answered that she thought that they were telling the truth.

went on to elaborate, explaining why she believed them.

She then

This error evidences a violation of Rule 608

Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah case law which "prohibits any testimony as to a witness's
truthfulness on a particular occasion."75 An effective advocate would have been aware of this rule
Tr. 140-168.
Tr. 172-173.
Tr. Id..
Tr. Id.
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989).
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and would not have violated it. Moreover, an eflFective advocate would not have asked this question of
the state social worker responsible for bringing the charges. What other answer could Ms. Maynes
have possible given than "yes" the children where telling the truth? If she felt that the children were
lying, the charges against the Defendant would not have been brought. It is impossible to imagine
under what circumstances she would have given any testimony other than that the children where
telling the truth. No possible tactical advantage could have been involved in counsel's decision to ask
this question. As such the first prong of Strickland is met. Furthermore, Ms. Maynes' testimony
prejudiced Appellant because the veracity of the victims was a key issue in this case. Here, Ms.
Maynes' provided the only evidence which suggested that these children could be trusted to tell the
truth. Therefore there is a reasonable probability that but for this error of counsel, the results would
have been different. Both parts of the Strickland test are thus satisfied and a new trial is required.
Violation of Rules 401, 402, 403, 801, and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c)

Rule 401 explains that relevant evidence means any evidence having a tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of any fact more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 402 states that "All relevant evidence is
admissible

[and] Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Rule 403 provides that relevant

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
Rule 801 defines hearsay as a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial which is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 802 states that
hearsay is not admissible.
In order to undertake the important responsibility of trial advocacy an attorney should know of
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these rules and the protections that they afford a defendant. Appellant's attorney appears to have not
been aware of them. This is shown by the fact that he neglected to take advantage of their protection
by objecting when the State introduced hearsay evidence and a vast amount of irrelevant evidence
which was damaging to the defendant. Certain flagrant examples include: 1) The social worker testify
at great length about how angry the Appellant became when she found out that Holly was being
removed from her home.

This testimony was prejudicial to Appellant because it cast her in a bad

light. It was not relevant to the matter because it does not make it more probable that Appellant
abused her child. 2) This same social worker providing hearsay testimony about an angry conversation
77

that Appellant allegedly had with workers at the shelter where Holly was taken.

•

This information

was obviously hearsay and was prejudicial to the Appellant. It cast her as an unlikable person. (3) Ms.
Lane Steward, a school aid, was allowed to testified about her personal belief that it was improper for
Appellant to have phone conversations in the teachers lounge regarding details of Will and Holly's
behavior. Ms. Lane Stewart stated that "this was the point where I got up and left the room. If it had
78

been my child, I would not want someone to hear that. I got up and left out of respect."

This

witness's feelings about Appellant's phone conversation were not relevant to whether or not appellant
committed the crimes alleged in the information. Again, this testimony cast appellant in a negative
light. 4) Linda Perkins, the school principal, was also allowed to testify about her personal feelings by
telling the jury "I felt sick at [sic] my stomach to begin with when the moment of truth hit me what had

T r . 155-158.
T r . 158.
Tr. 181.
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been going on possibly."

Again, this witness's feeling were not relevant and there admission into

evidence created obvious prejudice against Appellant. 5) Ms. Walton, one of Holly's teachers, testified
that on one occasion she was telling the class a story and "as I was telling the story, I raised my hands
and Holly ducked and covered her head with her hands."80 The inference was that Holly was so used
to being beaten by the defendant, that when someone raises a hand she automatically ducks her head.
This information is not relevant to whether Appellant hit her children and was highly prejudicial.
Testimony showed that Will often hit holly.81 David Ward admitted to having hit her.

Thus any

reflexive action that she may have made in response to the teachers raised hand, does not provide
evidence that the Appellant ever hit this child. As such Holly's reaction casts no reliable presumption
upon the behavior of the Appellant and as such is not relevant and is highly prejudicial. If this
information was relevant, it should still have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403 which provides that
relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. The inference that Appellant was responsible for Holly's reflexive reaction is more
prejudicial than probative, and should have been excluded or at the very least objected to by defense
counsel. (6) Lastly, when the prosecution had the defendant on the stand the prosecutor asked
defendant "So, do you know what is going to happen to you, if you will be able to continue teaching if
you're found guilty." The appellant answered "I will be terminated." The prosecution then asked," Is
their anything else you could do" to which appellant answered "I have a current dental assisting

Tr. 201.
Tr. 221.
Tr. 199.
T r . 123.
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credential. . ."

During this colloquy Appellant's counsel did not object as the State elicited this

irrelevant testimony. No tactical basis exists that would justify counsel's failure to object to this line of
questioning. By failing to object while the State illicite this irrelevant evidence Defense Counsel failed
to provide the Appellant with competent representation. Therefore the first prong of Strickland is
satisfied. The prejudice prong of Strickland is also satisfied because this evidence made it much easier
for the jury to find appellant guilty. This information allowed the jury to believe that no great harm
would be done if they err against the defendant because she would not be left without a profession.
While it would not be proper for a jury to consider the defendant's work situation while determining
guilt or innocence certainly it would weigh on a juror's mind that an improper guilty verdict would
leave the defendant without any means to support herself As such the Appellant was harmed by the
introduction of this irrelevant evidence.
By failing to object to all of the above referenced testimony, counsel failed to perform his role
as Appellant's advocate. The State was allowed to enter a plethora of evidence which casts Appellant
in a bad light. This failure was not reasonable under any circumstances and rendered counsel's
representation ineffective.

Had this information not come before the jury, there is a reasonable

probability that the jury would have believed the testimony of the Defendant's many character
witnesses and would have acquitted her of these charges. Therefore, both prongs of the Strickland test
are met and Appellant should be granted a new trial.
While it is true that evidentiary error typically must be objected to at trial, in Verde, the court
considered a claim similar to this Appellant's and determined that appellate review is proper when the
Tr. 493-494.
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-121 (Utah 1989)
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error is harmful and so "obvious" that it can properly be termed "plain error." In this case the
evidentiary errors, as explained above, were both harmful and obvious. Thus, plain error occurred by
the admission of the above referenced testimony into evidence, and appellate review of this issue is
85

proper.
Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine
(d)

Appellant's trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine any of the State's

witness to show their bias towards Appellant, and to show their lack of credibility. Cross -examination
is perhaps the defense attorney's most valuable tool. In Smith.86 the Supreme Court referred to cross
examination as "one of the safeguards to a fair trial." In David v. Alaska the United States Supreme
Court again considered the importance of cross- examination.

Further, the state court barred the

defense from cross- examining a juvenile who was an important state witness. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the state court. They held that: "petitioner's right to probe into the influence
of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness" is of paramount importance.
Unfortunately for Appellant in this matter, her attorney failed to meaningfully cross-examine
the State's witnesses. While cross-examining the alleged victims, who both testified that the Appellant
beat them, he failed to ask questions that would have revealed that these children where not credible.
Counsel was not unaware of the fact that these children often lied, even their father testified that they
often lied.88 Their counselor, Mr. Burdge, testified that they often lied.89 The Appellant testified that
State v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 120-121 (Utah 1989).

Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968),
David v. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
Tr. 127.
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the children often lied.

Nonetheless, Appellant's attorney never asked either child about their

propensity to lie, nor did he ask them to explain why lying was an issue in their therapy sessions. By
this omission, the jury was not allowed to see these children react when their credibility was challenged.
This failure is not within the range of competent representation and it prejudiced Appellant because a
not guilty verdict hinged upon whether or not the jury believed these children.
Counsel also failed to properly cross- examine David Ward, the Appellant's ex-husband.
David Ward testified that Appellant was too strict of a disciplinarian.

He also testified that she was

abusive to the children during their marriage.92 Additionally Appellant's attorney did not show the
obvious bias that this witness had by asking him what he had to gain, namely the marital home and the
continued custody of the children with child support, if Appellant was convicted. This failure is not
reasonable. Its harm to Appellant is obvious.
The State put on many witnesses who worked in the Lehi school system.

These witnesses

included teachers principals and aids.94 Although the record shows that defense counsel knew that
Officer Stewart had provided the school board with a copy of the children's videotaped statements
against the Appellant, he never asked any of these witnesses whether they had seen this tape and if so,
if it had aflfected either their view of the Appellant or their testimony at trial.

It is likely that some if

not all of these employees saw the tape. It is also likely that their seeing the tape would have biased
Tr. 357-358.
91

T r . 119-122.

92

Tr. Id.
Tr. 174-245.

94

Tr. I d .
Tr. 174-245, 622.
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these witnesses against the defendant and could have therefore affected their testimony during her trial.
By failing to ask these questions and expose these biases that may have existed against Appellant, her
counsel failed to represent her in an objectively reasonable manner. This failing prejudiced Appellant
since there is a reasonable likelihood that had these witnesses' bias been exposed, the jury would have
been less likely to believe their testimony.
Defense counsel failed to ask his own witness questions, which would have elicited testimonial
evidence of the defendant's innocence. The therapist who saw the children for the year and a half prior
to the time they where taken from Appellant testified on behalf of Appellant. Defense counsel
neglected to ask him certain questions that would have illustrated to the court that it was unlikely that
these children were being abused by Appellant. He did not ask:
1)

Did you ever notice that the children where unusually bruised of injured
during the time that they were in your care?

2)

Did you ever report to either the Department of Family Services or the
police that these children where being abused while in defendant's
care?

3)

Was there any indication that these children where being abused while
in your care?

By failing to ask these questions he failed to utilize possibly the most important defense
witness. This evidences a performance, which falls below what competent counsel would have done in
this case. Absent this error it is likely that the jury would have rendered a different decision.
The record shows that hefiledno responsive motions to either the State's Motion in Limine or
the State's Motion to Allow in a videotaped interview of the children in which they accuse Appellant of
beating them.
Additionally he did not take the time to review a videotaped interview that his client gave to
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the police regarding the alleged abuse. He had a duty to view this tape prior to developing a trial
strategy and in any event prior to putting her on the stand. By not doing so he failed to adequately
represent his client. This failure made the defendant appear dishonest during cross- examination
because she could not remember minute details of the interview, which took place almost eight months
prior to the trial.

There is no acceptable rationale for Counsel's failure to view the tape. Therefore

counsel failed to represent the defendant in a competent manner. This failing affected his client by
making her look dishonest. Given the fact that believability of the Appellant was key to her defense,
this failure caused her great prejudice. Thus, absent this failure there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have acquitted this defendant.
Based upon the forgoing, it is proper that this Court find that Appellant's counsel did not
provide her with competent assistance as is required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. This failure caused Appellant harm. Therefore, reversal is proper.
Violation of Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence
Utah Rule of Evidence 608(a) prohibits one witness from testifying to the truthfulness of
another. This rule provides in pertinent part:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitation: (1) the evidence may refer only
to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.. .(emphasis added).
This rule permits testimony concerning a witness's general character or reputation for truthfulness or
untruthfulness but prohibits any testimony as to a witnesses's truthfulness on a particular
occasion.97 Experts "may not express an opinion on whether a witness was truthful on a particular
96

Tr. 460, 492, 688-689.

97

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989) (other citations omitted) (emphasis

ded) .
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occasion."

In Lairbv

the court, presented with a child abuse case, stated in dictum that, "Dr.

Liebroder (an expert in the case) could not have offered any views on the testimony actually given."

An appellate court will reverse based upon the admission of such evidence, "[i]f, in the absence
of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
defendant..."100
In this case, the objectionable evidence at issue was elicited by Appellant's trial counsel who
asked the State's witness, Ms. Shilo Maynes, a D.F.S. social worker, whether she thought that the
children where telling the truth when they stated that Appellant had abused them. Ms. Maynes,
answered "yes," and then went on to explain how and why she believed them. This testimony is
prohibited by Utah Rule of Evidence 608 and Rimmasch.
This evidentiary error was harmful and prejudicial to the Appellant. Appellant presented
several character witnesses who stated that she was a good mother.101 The State presented witness
saying conversely that she was not a good mother.

The State put on the testimony of several school

teachers who said the children had a lot of bruises.103 Appellant, conversely, put on the testimony of
several school teachers and Will's scout leader, who testified that the children did not have a lot of

Id. at 391.
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984).
State v. Riinmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989), citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116
(other citations omitted).
Tr. 507, 574, 585-590, 602-658, 668-682.
Tr. 97-287.
Tr. 97-287.
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bruises.

Appellant testified that she did not beat her children, the children testified that she did.
The jury's task became deciding whom to believe, Appellant or the children.

Thus, the

believability of the children was of great concern to the jurors. Throughout this matter the children
were portrayed as not trustworthy. The children's teachers testified that the children lied.106 Both of
the children's parents testified that the children often lied.107 The children's therapist testified that the
children lied.

Officer Hodson, who returned Will to his mother after one occasion when Will ran

away from home, testified that Will lied to him.109 Mrs. Beck, Will's scout leader, testified that Will
lied to her.

Ms. Maynes' testimony, that the children were telling the truth, was the only information

presented at trial, which tended to suggest that these children were trustworthy.

Under such

circumstances there is a reasonable likelihood that absent this error the verdict would have been
different. Therefore, reversal is required. Although no objection preserves the right of Appellant to
appeal the wrongful admission of this evidence, appellate review is still appropriate because this error
amounts to "plain error."

Plain error occurs when the error is "obvious" and harmful.

In this case

plain error occurred because: 1) it is obvious that one witness may not testify that another witness was
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telling the truth and, 2) the testimony harmed the defendant because it bolstered the veracity of
otherwise not credible witnesses.
The Cumulative Error Doctrine
(e)

Under the cumulative error doctrine, the court will reverse if the cumulative

effect of the several errors undermines the court's confidence that a fair trial was had.

Citing,

Whitehead114 accord Hobnson.1
In this case, there was sufficient error and ineffectiveness on the part of Defense Counsel to
undermine the court's confidence that a fair trial was had. As noted above, the list of errors and of
Defense Counsel's failings is long. It includes: 1) The videotaped interview of the children being
provided to the school board, and defense counsel's failure to illicit testimony to determine whether the
school employees who testified for the state viewed this videotape. 2) the introduction of evidence
disallowed under Rimmash and Rule 608(a); 3) Defense Counsel's failure to object to objectionable
testimony; 4) Defense Counsel's failure to exclude witnesses pursuant to Rule 615; 5) Defense
Counsel's failure to give a written response to the state's pretrial motions and memorandum; 6)
Defense Counsel's failure to view the videotaped statement given by the Appellant to the police before
putting her on the stand and subjecting her to cross-examination; 7) Defense Counsel's failure to
question the credibility of the alleged victims' testimony; 8) Defense Counsel's Mure to ask key and
necessary questions of his own witnesses; 9) Defense Counsel's failure to show the bias of State's
witness, David Ward. 10) Defense Counsel's failure to effectively cross-examine any of the State's

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990)
State v, Hobnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989) (other citations omitted).
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witnesses.
Should the Court take the position that, taken individually, none of these errors or omissions
on the part of Appellant's trial counsel caused her suflBcient prejudice to undermine the Court's belief
that a fair trial was had, the Court may recognize that considered cumulatively, the irregularities, errors
and omissions, herein above discussed, do render the outcome of Appellant's trial unreliable and should
undermine the confidence that a reviewing court may have in the outcome of the matter in the trial
court. Thus, the cumulative error doctrine requires that the jury verdict be reversed and the case
remanded for a new tiial.

vn
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the jury verdict of guilty in this case and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
Dated ^ V ^ u ^ L 1997.

Paul Wtyte,
avid Paul
Wttfte, Counsel for Ap
Appellant
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